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Abstract
We prove a representation theorem for preference relations over count-
ably infinite lotteries that satisfy a generalized form of the Independence ax-
iom, without assuming Continuity. The representing space consists of lexi-
cographically ordered transfinite sequences of bounded real numbers. This
result is generalized to preference orders on abstract superconvex spaces.
1 Infinite Lotteries and Independence
Let a (discrete) lottery over a set of outcomes X be a function 𝜆 ∶ X → [0, 1] such
that∑x∈X 𝜆(x) = 1. LetΔX be the set of all such lotteries. Let a preference order
be a total preorder ≲ on ΔX. (That is, ≲ is assumed to be transitive, reflexive, and
complete in the sense that for each pair of lotteries, 𝜆 ≲ 𝜇 or 𝜇 ≲ 𝜆.)
A standard axiom of rational preference is the Independence axiom
(I) For any lotteries 𝜆, 𝜆′, 𝜇 ∈ ΔX and any probability 0 < p ≤ 1,
𝜆 < 𝜆′ iff p ⋅ 𝜆 + (1 − p) ⋅ 𝜇 < p ⋅ 𝜆′ + (1 − p) ⋅ 𝜇
Let an indexed family of lotteries be a function 𝜆 ∶ I → X, for any set I. For
total preorders, Independence can be equivalently restated:1
Thanks to Yoaav Isaacs for many discussions of the ideas on which this paper is based, and to
Tobias Fritz and the editors of the Journal of Mathematical Economics for comments.
1Hammond’s (1998) label (D) for this principle stands for “dominance.” But note that the principle
is stronger than a natural analogous dominance principle for outcomes, since it applies generally to
mixtures of lotteries. (See Buchak 2013, 162ff, for discussion of the normative import of this distinction.)
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(D) For any finite set I of indices, any probability distribution p ∈ ΔI, and any
indexed families of lotteries 𝜆, 𝜇 ∶ I → X, if 𝜆i ≲ 𝜇i for each i ∈ I, then
∑i
p(i) ⋅ 𝜆i ≲∑i
p(i) ⋅ 𝜇i
If furthermore 𝜆i < 𝜇i for some i such that p(i) > 0, this preference is strict.
This naturally suggests a generalized principle, which simply drops the qualification
“finite” (see Blackwell and Girshick 1954; Hammond 1998, sec. 8.4).2
(D*) For any set I of indices, any probability distribution p ∈ ΔI, and any families
of lotteries 𝜆, 𝜇 ∶ I → X, if 𝜆i ≲ 𝜇i for each i ∈ I, then
∑i
p(i) ⋅ 𝜆i ≲∑i
p(i) ⋅ 𝜇i
If furthermore 𝜆i < 𝜇i for some i ∈ I such that p(i) > 0, this preference is
strict.
This very natural principle can be motivated by some of the same considerations as
the original Independence principle and its close cousin, the Sure Thing Principle.
For example, Savage (1954, sec. 2.7) writes:
A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers
the outcome of the next presidential election relevant to the attractiveness of
the purchase. So, to clarify the matter for himself, he asks whether he would
buy if he knew that the Republican candidate were going to win, and decides
that he would do so. Similarly, he considers whether he would buy if he knew
that the Democratic candidate were going to win, and again finds that he
would do so. Seeing that he would buy in either event, he decides that he
should buy, even though he does not know which event obtains … [E]xcept
possibly for the assumption of simple ordering, I know of no other extralogical
principle governing decisions that finds such ready acceptance.
The principle (D*) can be similarly motivated, by generalizing to questions with
more than two possible answers. Let E1,E2,… be countably many mutually exclu-
sive and jointly exhaustive events. If you prefer to buy if E1 obtains, and you also
2Again, this label is Hammond’s. Russell and Isaacs (forthcoming) call this principle “Countable
Independence,” to distinguish it more clearly from the weaker dominance principle concerning out-
comes. The qualification “Countable” is included just because any discrete probability distribution
p ∈ ΔI must have countable support.
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prefer to buy if E2 obtains, and so on, then this seems like a strong reason to buy,
unconditionally. Suppose that you assign probability 𝜆(x) to the hypothesis that
outcome x will result from buying (for each x ∈ X). Likewise, you assign conditional
probability 𝜆i(x) to the hypothesis that outcome x will result from buying if event Ei
obtains. By the law of total probability, 𝜆 = ∑i pi ⋅ 𝜆i, where pi is the probability you
assign to event Ei. So if your conditional and unconditional preferences between
acts accord with your preferences between these associated lotteries, (D*) follows from
the countable generalization of Savage’s principle.3
When the set of outcomes is infinite, (D*) genuinely strengthens the finitary condi-
tion (D), and the equivalent Independence axiom (I). There are preference orderings
on ΔX satisfying Independence which are representable by unbounded real utilities
(see Fine 2008). But no such orderings satisfy (D*). This arises from well-known
cases like the St. Petersburg paradox and the two-envelope paradox (Menger 1934;
see also Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997, 44; for a striking related result see Seiden-
feld, Schervish, and Kadane 2009).
One standard response to these puzzle cases is to impose the requirement that pref-
erences can be represented by a bounded set of real numbers. But in fact, this is an
overreaction. While (D*) is incompatible with preferences that are representable by
unbounded real utilities, it is perfectly compatible with preferences that are not rep-
resentable by bounded real utilities—because these preferences are not representable
by real-valued utilities at all. A simple example is the lexicographic order on lot-
teries in Δ{0, 1, 2} with three possible outcomes. Preferences like these conflict
with the standard Archimedean Axiom (or the Continuity axiom, which is equivalent in
this context), which essentially rules out “infinite” or “infinitesimal” utilities. In the
presence of the Archimedean Axiom, (D*) is indeed equivalent to representability
by bounded real utilities (Blackwell and Girshick 1954; Hammond 1998, sec. 8.4
and 8.5).
But while the combination of (D*) and the Archimedean Axiom is well-understood,
it is also worthwhile to investigate the constraints imposed on preferences by (D*) in
the general non-Archimedean case. This is for two reasons. First, while there are
strong normative arguments for (D*), there are not such strong arguments in favor
of the Archimedean Axiom; the latter may not be a genuine constraint on rational
preference, but merely a technically convenient simplification (see for example Luce
and Raiffa 1989, 27; Hájek and Nover 2008, 649ff). Second, this exploration helps
us conceptually distinguish two very different kinds of “infinity problem” in deci-
sion theory. Some difficulties arise from unbounded utilities, like the St. Petersburg
3For a closely related “consequentialist” argument see Hammond (1998, sec. 8.4). For further
discusssion see Russell and Isaacs (forthcoming, sec. 2).
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puzzle and the two-envelope puzzle. Other difficulties arise from infinite utilities,
like Pascal’s wager (for discussion see Hájek 2003). If (D*) is a normative require-
ment on preferences, it turns out that this will spare rational agents the first kind of
difficulty—but not the second.4
The principle (D*) imposes interesting structural constraints on preferences. In a
sense we can make precise, this principle rules out unbounded finite utilities; but it is
perfectly compatible with infinite utilities, and indeed, with infinitely many different
“regimes” of infinite utilities. The structure of these “regimes” is highly constrained:
in particular, (D*) rules out ascending chains of lotteries each of which is infinitely
better than those before it.
In other words, these utility “regimes” or dimensions have the structure of ordinals.
Classic representation theorems for non-Archimedean preferences (such as Fish-
burn 1971) represent utilities as lexicographically ordered n-tuples of real numbers
(u1, u2,…, un), indexed by numbers up to some finite n.5 But not all preferences sat-
isfying (D*) have utility representations given by finite sequences: in general, some
preferences require infinite sequences. Moreover, they can require quite long in-
finite sequences. Some infinite sequences are indexed by just the finite numbers
1, 2, 3,…. Other sequences have further dimensions beyond those, and may be
indexed by ordinal numbers
1, 2,…,𝜔, 𝜔 + 1, 𝜔 + 2,…, 2𝜔, 2𝜔 + 1,…,𝜔2, 𝜔2 + 1,…
and so on, as far as you like.6 In principle, the length of the utility sequences we’ll
need is only limited by the cardinality of the set of outcomes X: if this is a large
infinite set, then we may require very large infinite ordinal numbers. The key struc-
tural feature of the ordinals is that they are well-ordered. This tells us that for any two
distinct sequences of real numbers indexed by ordinals, there is a first index at which
they differ. Thus for any ordinal 𝛼, we can lexicographically order the sequences of
real numbers indexed by the ordinals before 𝛼.
4Collapsing these issues might lead one to the natural but incorrect conclusion that the difficulties
raised by the St. Petersburg game could be avoided by dropping the Archimedean Axiom, as suggested
by Hájek and Nover (2008).
5Fishburn (1974) and Martínez-Legaz (1998) survey prior work on lexicographic utilities. Borie
(2016) proves a utility representation theorem for non-Archimedean preferences without complete-
ness. Fishburn’s and Borie’s theorems apply to finite mixture spaces, without considering constraints
like (D*) on preference between infinite mixtures of lotteries.
6For an introduction to ordinals see for example Hrbacek and Jech (1999) or Potter (2004). Exactly
how far the ordinals go is a deep question in the foundations of mathematics: it is equivalent to the
question of what “large cardinals” there are, andmany different answers to this question are consistent
with the standard axioms of set theory, ZFC. But these axioms do tell us that for any set whatsoever
(of any cardinality) there are enough ordinals to index that set.
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Here we will give a utility representation theorem for preference orders that sat-
isfy (D*), without assuming the Archidemean Axiom: preference orders that sat-
isfy (D*) are precisely those that can be represented by bounded lexicographic utilities.
This representation theorem extends the classic results of Hausner (1952) andHaus-
ner and Wendel (1952) concerning non-Archimedean preference orders. Hausner
and Wendel’s results show that any preference order on lotteries that satisfies Inde-
pendence is representable by a convex subset of a lexicographically ordered vector
space. Our extension of their result shows that the infinitary generalization of Inde-
pendence (D*) requires, first, that this lexicographically ordered vector space takes a
special concrete form—namely, the Banach space of bounded sequences ℓ∞(𝛼) for
some ordinal 𝛼—and second, that this convex subset is itself bounded (with respect
to the∞-norm). Restricting utilities to a bounded set of sequences blocks the con-
struction of a St. Petersburg lottery. Nonetheless, this representation permits highly
non-trivial “infinite utility” structure, since the space of utilites can have arbitrarily
high dimension.
2 Representation Theorem
In this section we will take lotteries to be concrete probability distributions. In Sec-
tion 3 we will consider a more general approach where “lotteries” are elements of
a space with an abstract countable mixture operation, called a superconvex space. As
it turns out, this apparent additional generality does not actually add much: any
ordering of such space is equivalent to an ordering on an ordinary lottery space.
We begin with some basic definitions.
Definition 1. (König 1986) Let V be a Banach space. A subset C ⊆ V is called
𝜎-convex iff C is closed under countable mixtures, in the following sense: for each
p ∈ Δ𝜔 and sequence x ∈ C𝜔, the infinite sum
∑i<𝜔
pi ⋅ xi
is well-defined and contained in C. We will also use the more compact notation
Σ(p, x) for this mixture.
If C ⊆ V and C′ ⊆ V are both 𝜎-convex sets, a function f ∶ C → C′ is mixture-
preserving iff for each p ∈ Δ𝜔 and x ∈ C𝜔,
f(Σ(p, x)) = ∑i
pi ⋅ f(xi)
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The restriction of any continuous linearmap to a 𝜎-convex set is mixture-preserving.
In particular, this holds for any contraction (a linear map f ∶ V → V′ such that
‖f(v)‖V′ ≤ ‖v‖V; equivalently, f(BV) ⊆ BV′).
Example 1. For any nonempty set X, the setΔX of discrete lotteries with outcomes
in X is a 𝜎-convex subset of the Banach space ℓ1(X) (consisting of all functions
u ∶ X → ℝ for which the 1-norm ‖u‖ = ∑x∈X |u(x)| is finite).
Example 2. Let V be a Banach space. The closed unit ball in V
BV = {x ∈ V | ‖x‖ ≤ 1}
is a 𝜎-convex subset of V. In particular, let 𝛼 be an ordinal, and consider the Ba-
nach space ℓ∞(𝛼) of length 𝛼 bounded ordinal sequences of real numbers, with
the ∞-norm ‖x‖ = supi<𝛼 |xi|. The closed unit ball Bℓ∞(𝛼), which consists of all
𝛼-sequences of numbers in the interval [−1, 1], is a 𝜎-convex subset of ℓ∞(𝛼).
Definition 2. (a) A preorder on a set X is a reflexive and transitive relation ≲
on X. We say x ∼ y iff x ≲ y and y ≲ x. We say x < y iff x ≲ y but not y ≲ x. A
preorder is total iff for each x, y ∈ X, either x ≲ y or y ≲ x. A partial order
is a preorder which is also antisymmetric (if x ∼ y then x = y). A total order
is a partial order which is also total.
(b) If (X, ≲) and (X′, ≲′) are preordered sets, a function f ∶ X → X′ is mono-
tone iff for any x ≲ y in X, f(x) ≲′ f(y) in X′. It is strictly monotone iff the
converse also holds, so for any x, y ∈ X, x ≲ y iff f(x) ≲′ f(y).
(c) A preorder on a vector space V is linear iff vector addition andmultiplication
by positive scalars are both monotone functions. That is, for any x, y, z ∈ V
and a ∈ ℝ+, if x ≲ y then x+z ≲ y+z and ax ≲ ay. A preordered/partially
ordered/totally ordered vector space is a vector space equipped with a
linear preorder/partial order/total order.
(d) If V and V′ are preordered vector spaces, a function f ∶ V → V′ is positive iff
for each x ∈ V such that x ≳ 0, f(x) ≳ 0, and strictly positive iff additionally
for each x ∈ V such that x > 0, f(x) > 0.
It is straightforward to check that a linear map between preordered vector spaces is
(strictly) positive iff it is (strictly) monotone.
Here is the main theorem we will prove:
Theorem 1. For any set X, a total preorder on the set ΔX of discrete lotteries satisfies (D*) iff
for some ordinal 𝛼 there is a strictly monotone mixture-preserving function from ΔX to Bℓ∞(𝛼)
with its lexicographic order.
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First, we will show that the order on lotteries can be represented in a totally ordered
Banach space which a certain boundedness property. Second, we will show that we
can define a strictly monotone contraction from any such ordered Banach space to
ℓ∞(𝛼).
We begin by extending the order on lotteries to the surrounding Banach space
ℓ1(X).
Lemma 1. For any total preorder ≲ on ΔX that satisfies the Independence axiom
(I), there is a unique linear total preorder ≲∗ on ℓ1(X) such that
(a) The embedding of (ΔX, ≲) in (ℓ1(X), ≲∗) is strictly monotone; and
(b) The function h ∶ ℓ1(X) → ℝ such that h(u) = ∑x∈X u(x) is positive.
(In particular, for each lottery 𝜆 ∈ ΔX, we have h(𝜆) = 1 and thus 𝜆 >∗ 0.)
Proof. First, for any nonzero u ∈ ℓ1(X) such that h(u) = 0, there exist 𝜆, 𝜇 ∈ ΔX
such that u = ‖u‖ ⋅ (𝜆 − 𝜇). For x ∈ X let
u+(x) =
{
u(x) if u(x) > 0
0 otherwise and u
−(x) =
{
−u(x) if u(x) < 0
0 otherwise
We have 0 = h(u) = ‖u+‖ − ‖u−‖ and ‖u‖ = ‖u+‖ + ‖u−‖. It follows that 𝜆 =
2u+/‖u‖ and 𝜇 = 2u−/‖u‖ are elements of ΔX such that u = ‖u‖(𝜆 − 𝜇).
Next, we define the order on ℓ1(X) lexicographically, first using the function h, and
second using the order on lotteries. For u ∈ ℓ1(X), let u ≳∗ 0 iff either of the
following cases holds:
(a) h(u) > 0, or
(b) h(u) = 0 and u = ‖u‖ ⋅ (𝜆 − 𝜇) for some 𝜆, 𝜇 ∈ ΔX such that 𝜆 ≳ 𝜇.
(In general, v ≳∗ u iff v − u ≳∗ 0.) It is straightforward to check that (I) implies that
this order is linear and satisfies the two conditions of the lemma.
For uniqueness, it suffices to check that, for any linear order ≲∗ on ℓ1(X), and any
nonzero u ∈ ℓ1(X), if h(u) = 0 and u = ‖u‖(𝜆 − 𝜇), then 𝜆 ≳ 𝜇 iff u ≳∗ 0. Both
directions follow from linearity.
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In order to get to a totally ordered Banach space, the natural thing to do next is
quotient out the set I of vectors which are equivalent to zero. The difficulty is that
in general the quotient space may not retain the structure of a Banach space: this
holds only if the subspace I is closed. It does turn out that our axiom (D*) guarantees
this, but this takes a little bit of showing.
Lemma 2. For any preordered Banach space V, let
B+V = {x ∈ BV ∣ x > 0}
If (ΔX, ≲) satisfies (D*), then B+ℓ1(X) is 𝜎-convex (with respect to the extended
order ≲∗).
Proof. Let p ∈ Δ𝜔 and x1, x2,… ∈ B+ℓ1(X). Then h(xi) ≥ 0 for each i. If h(xi) > 0
for any i, then
h(Σ(p, x)) = ∑i
pi ⋅ h(xi) > 0
so in that case Σ(p, x) is positive as well. Otherwise, h(xi) = 0 for every i ∈ 𝜔. In
that case, for each i there is some 𝜆i > 𝜇i in ΔX such that xi = ‖xi‖(𝜆i − 𝜇i). Since
‖xi‖ ≤ 1, the series∑i pi‖xi‖ converges to some value a ∈ ℝ+. Then
∑i
pi ⋅ xi = a(∑i
pi‖xi‖
a ⋅ 𝜆i −∑i
pi‖xi‖
a ⋅ 𝜇i)
By (D*) and the definition of ≲∗, this is positive.
The following very simple fact really contains the core idea of the main theorem.
The central “paradoxical” feature of the St. Petersburg lottery is that it is strictly
preferred over every one of its outcomes. (D*) rules out this situation.
Lemma 3. Let V be a preordered Banach space such that B+V is 𝜎-convex. There
is no p ∈ Δ𝜔 and x1, x2,… ∈ B+V such that
xi < Σ(p, x) for each i ∈ 𝜔
Proof. If there were such p and x1, x2,…, then the vectors 12 (Σ(p, x) − xi) would each
be in B+V. This would imply that B+V also contains the mixture
∑i
pi ⋅ (12(Σ(p, x) − xi) =
1
2(Σ(p, x) −∑i
pi ⋅ xi) = 0
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And this is false.
This means that (D*) blocks the construction of St. Petersburg lotteries. There are
two different versions of this. One kind of “improper mixture” arises from un-
bounded relatively finite utilities, and another arises from infinite ascending chains
of relatively infinite utilities. Both kinds are captured by the following condition.
Lemma 4. Let V be a preordered Banach space such that B+V is 𝜎-convex. Then
there is no supergeometric sequence x1, x2,… ∈ B+V such that 2xi ≲ xi+1 for
each i ∈ 𝜔.
Proof. This is the St. Petersburg paradox. Suppose x1, x2,… ∈ B+V is a supergeo-
metric sequence, and let
w =∑i
2−i ⋅ xi
We will prove that this is an improper mixture. Consider the truncated sum
wn = ∑
0<i≤2n+n
2−ixi
≳ ∑n<i≤2n+n
2−ixi = 2−n ∑
0<j≤2n
2−jxn+j
≳ 2−n ∑
0<j≤2n
xn = xn
using linearity together with the facts that each xi is positive and xn ≲ 2−jxn+j for
each j. Furthermore, w is the sum of wn and a mixture of the remaining terms xi,
each of which are positive. Let N = 2n + n. Then:
w = wn +∑i>N
2−i ⋅ xi
= wn + 2−N∑i
2−i ⋅ xN+i > wn
The last step uses our assumption that B+V is 𝜎-convex, which implies that the
mixture of elements of B+V is positive.
Here is another way of putting this consequence.
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Definition 3. A preordered vector space V is nice iff every norm-bounded subset
of V is order-bounded.
Lemma 5. If V is a totally preordered Banach space and B+V is 𝜎-convex, then
every subspace of V is nice.
Proof. Let U be a subspace of V. It suffices to show that B+U has an order bound
in U. If not, then for each u ∈ U there is some x ∈ B+U such that 2u < x. So in
particular there is a supergeometric sequence x1, x2,… in B+U (and thus in B+V)
such that 2xi < xi+1 for each i.
Now we will introduce a few useful concepts for working with non-Archimedean
ordered vector spaces. (See Paulsen and Tomforde 2007; Emelyanov 2014.)
Definition 4. For a preordered vector space V, define
I(V) = {x ∈ V ∣ x ∼ 0}
N(V) = {x ∈ V ∣ for some v ∈ V, for every a ∈ ℝ+, −av ≲ x ≲ av}
Intuitively, N(V) is the set of vectors which are infinitesimally small in comparision
to some other vector. V is Archimedean iff N(V) = I(V). V is trivial iff I(V) = V.
For any v ∈ V, define
F(v) = {x ∈ V ∣ for some a ∈ ℝ+, −av ≲ x ≲ av }
Intuitively, F(v) is the set of vectors which are finite or infinitesimal in comparison
to v. A vector e ∈ V is an order unit iff F(e) = V.
The following facts are straightforward.
Lemma 6. (a) For each v ∈ V, I(V), N(V), and F(v) are subspaces of V.
(b) V is partially ordered iff I(V) = {0}.
(c) If e is an order unit for V and e ∈ N(V), then V is trivial.
(d) If V is a Banach space and e is an order bound for B+V, then e is an order unit
for V.
Lemma 7. If V is a totally preordered Banach space and B+V is 𝜎-convex, then
I(V) is closed.
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Proof. Suppose v ∈ V is not in I(V): that is, v ≁ 0. We will show that v is not
in the closure of I(V): that is, there is some 𝜀 > 0 such that for each u ∈ I(V),
‖v − u‖ ≥ 𝜀. Without loss of generality, assume v ≴ 0. (Otherwise we can argue
similarly regarding −v.) Consider the subspace F(v). By Lemma 5, this subspace
contains an order bound for BF(v). This means there is some a ∈ ℝ+ such that
x ≲ av for each x ∈ BF(v).
Now suppose u ∈ I(V): that is, u ∼ 0. Then (v − u) ∼ v, which implies that
v − u ∈ F(v), and (v − u)/‖v − u‖ is in BF(v). Thus:
v
‖v − u‖ ∼
v − u
‖v − u‖ ≲ av
Thus
(1 − a‖v − u‖)v ≲ 0
By assumption v ≴ 0, so we must have ‖v − u‖ ≥ 1/a.
Lemma8. For any preordered vector spaceV, there is a strictly positive contraction
from V onto some partially ordered vector space iff I(V) is closed.
Proof. It is a standard fact that a subset of V is a closed subspace iff it is the kernel of
a continuous linear surjection, and in particular a contraction f ∶ V → V′ (see for
example Conway 1994, 70). We can define a partial order ≤′ on V′ with respect to
which f is strictly positive: let 0 ≤′ f(x) iff 0 ≲′ x. The fact that ker f = I(V) implies
that this is a well-defined partial order. (Compare Emelyanov 2014, sec. 1)
Putting this much together completes the first part.
Proposition 1. If ≲ is a total preorder on ΔX that satisfies (D*), then there is a
strictly monotone mixture-preserving function from ΔX to B+V for some totally
ordered Banach space V such that B+V is 𝜎-convex.
For the second part, we will prove a representation theorem for totally ordered Ba-
nach spaces of this type. The main idea of this part is that we can quotient out the
infinitesimals from an ordered vector space. In the case of a non-trivial totally or-
dered nice vector space, the resulting quotient space is in fact isomorphic toℝ. Thus
if every subspace is nice, we can keep descending to smaller and smaller infinitesimal
scales, representing each regime by real numbers, until we run out.
To prove this, we will appeal to the following fact, which is a variant of the Hahn-
Banach Theorem for ordered vector spaces.
11
Lemma 9. (Paulsen and Tomforde 2007, Corollary 2.15) Let (V, ≤) be a partially
ordered vector space with order unit e. If E is a subspace of V containing e, then any
positive linear functional f ∶ E → ℝmay be extended to a positive linear functional
g ∶ V → ℝ whose restriction to E is f.
Corollary 1. If (V, ≤) is a totally ordered nice vector space, then there is a positive
contraction f ∶ V → ℝ such that ker f = N(V).
Proof. Let e be an upper bound for BV, and thus an order unit in V. Assume without
loss of generality that ‖e‖ ≥ 1. Let E = {ae ∣ a ∈ ℝ}, and let f(ae) = a for each
element ae ∈ E. Then let g be a positive linear extension of f to V.
To show that g is a contraction, it suffices to show that for each x ∈ BV, |g(x)| ≤ 1.
This is clear, since in that case −e ≲ x ≲ e, g is positive, and g(e) = 1.
To show ker g = N(V), first suppose x ∈ N(V). It follows that
−ae ≲ x ≲ ae for every a ∈ ℝ+
Thus since g is positive and extends f,
−a ≤ g(x) ≤ a for every a ∈ ℝ+
and thus g(x) = 0. Conversely, if x ∉ N(V), then (since V is totally ordered) for some
a ∈ ℝ+, x ≳ ae or x ≲ −ae. So either g(x) ≥ a or g(x) ≤ −a, and in either case
g(x) ≠ 0.
Proposition 2. Let (V, ≤) be a totally ordered Banach space such that B+V is 𝜎-
convex. Then for some ordinal 𝛼, there is a contraction from V to ℓ∞(𝛼) which is
strictly positive with respect to the lexicographic order on ℓ∞(𝛼).
Proof. The idea is to repeatedly apply Corollary 1, descending to smaller and smaller
infinitesimal subspaces until we run out.
First we define a descending chain of subspaces of V by transfinite recursion, as
follows.
V0 = V
Vi+1 = N(Vi)
V𝜆 =⋂i<𝜆
Vi
In other words, Vi consists of the “level i infinitesimals (or smaller).” This sequence is
strictly decreasing as long as Vi is non-trivial: each subspace Vi is nice, which implies
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that it has an order unit, which implies that N(Vi) ⊊ Vi unless Vi is trivial. So there
must be some least ordinal 𝛼 such that V𝛼 is trivial. We’ll consider the sequence of
subspaces (Vi)i<𝛼 .
For each non-zero vector x ∈ V, there is some i < 𝛼 such that x ∈ Vi ∖ Vi+1.
Intuitively, this is the “scale” of x: the largest utility regime to which xmakes a non-
infinitesimal contribution. (We know x ∉ V𝛼 , since x > 0 and V𝛼 is trivial. So there
is some i < 𝛼 such that x ∉ Vi+1. So there is some least ordinal i such that x ∉ Vi+1.
If i is a successor ordinal, this immediately implies x ∈ Vi. If i is a limit ordinal, then
Vi is the intersection of all previous successor stages, each of which contains x, and
so again x ∈ Vi.)
Next, we can define each component of the function f ∶ V → ℓ∞(𝛼). Let i < 𝛼. By
Corollary 1, there is a positive contraction g ∶ Vi → ℝ such that ker g = N(Vi) =
Vi+1. By the Hahn-Banach Extension Theorem (see for example Conway 1994,
Theorem 6.2, p. 78), g can be extended to a contraction fi ∶ V → ℝ defined on the
whole space. Note that this extension fi is not generally positive, but we do have
fi(x) > 0 for each x ∈ Vi ∖ Vi+1 such that x > 0
(In this case we know fi(x) = g(x) ≥ 0 because g is positive, and fi(x) ≠ 0 because
x ∉ ker g.)
The resulting linear map f ∶ V → ℓ∞(𝛼) with these components is a contraction:
by definition, ‖f(x)‖∞ = supi |fi(x)|, and by construction |fi(x)| ≤ ‖x‖ for each i.
To show that f is strictly positive, consider any x ∈ V such that x > 0. Let i be the
“scale” of x such that x ∈ Vi ⧵ Vi+1. Since x ∈ Vi and the sequence is nested, for
all j < i we have x ∈ Vj+1 = ker fj, which means fj(x) = 0. Since x ∈ Vi ∖ Vi+1 and
x > 0, we also have fi(x) > 0. Thus f(x) > 0 according to the lexicographic ordering
on ℓ∞(𝛼).
This essentially completes the proof of one direction Theorem 1. For the other
direction we just need a couple additional facts, which are straightforward to check.
Lemma 10. Let C and C′ be 𝜎-convex sets. If (C′, ≲′) satisfies (D*) and there is a
strictly monotone mixture-preserving function f ∶ C → C′, then (C, ≲) satisfies (D*)
as well.
Lemma 11. The lexicographic order on Bℓ∞(𝛼) satisfies (D*).
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Proof of Theorem 1. One direction follows from Lemma 1, Proposition 1, and Propo-
sition 2. The converse follows from Lemma 10 and Lemma 11.
3 Superconvex Spaces
So far we have considered the concrete case of preference orders over lottery spaces:
the space of all discrete probability distributions over a given set of outcomes. But
we can alternatively consider a more abstract notion of a discrete mixture space in
which the “lotteries” are not given as probability distributions, but rather are just
some objects equipped with an abstract “discrete mixture” operation. This kind
of structure is called a superconvex space (or superconvex module) (König 1986;
Pümplun 1991; Nörtemann 2002). In general, there are superconvex spaces which
are not isomorphic to 𝜎-convex subsets of Banach spaces. Even so, it turns out
that any ordering of a general superconvex space is equivalent, in a natural sense,
to some ordering of a lottery space (Lemma 12). So we can still apply the same
representation theorem even in this more general setting.
For any set X, let 𝛿 ∶ X → ΔX be the function that takes each x ∈ X to the lottery
that assigns probability one to x.
Definition 5. A superconvex space is a set S together with an operation Σ ∶
Δ𝜔 × S𝜔 → S with the following properties:
(a) For any sequence of elements x ∈ S𝜔 and any index i ∈ 𝜔,
Σ(𝛿(i), x) = xi
(b) For any probability distribution p ∈ Δ𝜔, any sequence of probability distri-
butions q ∈ (Δ𝜔)𝜔, and any sequence of elements x ∈ S𝜔,
∑i
p(i) ⋅ (∑j
qi(j) ⋅ xj) =∑j (∑i
p(i) ⋅ qi(j)) ⋅ xj
Principle (a) says that putting all of the weight on the ith element just gives you that
same element xi. Principle (b) corresponds to simplification of compound lotteries: a
mixture of mixtures of elements of S can be “flattened” to an equivalent single-level
mixture.
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Here is an alternative way of describing superconvex structure, which is a bit more
elegant, since it eliminates the arbitrary indices. Instead of the operation Σ which
takes an indexed sequence of elements and a distribution over the set of indices, we
can define an operation 𝜎 ∶ ΔS → S which takes a distribution directly over the
elements of the superconvex space, and mixes those elements together with the ap-
propriate weights. Intuitively, an element ofΔS plays the role of a (discrete) random
variable taking values in S, and 𝜎 plays the role of an expectation operator.
For any function f ∶ X → Y, let Δf ∶ ΔX → ΔY be the obvious “lifted” function
that preserves mixtures. (That is, for any lottery 𝜆 ∈ ΔX, the lottery Δf(𝜆) ∈ ΔY
assigns to y ∈ Y the total probability that 𝜆 assigns to f−1(y).)
Proposition 3. Let S be a superconvex space. For any distribution 𝜆 ∈ ΔS, there
is a countable sequence x ∈ S𝜔 such that 𝜆 = ∑i 𝜆(xi) ⋅ 𝛿(xi). Let 𝜎 ∶ ΔS → S be
𝜎(𝜆) = ∑i
𝜆(xi) ⋅ xi
This is well-defined (it does not depend on the choice of sequence x), and we have
the two identities
𝜎(𝛿(x)) = x for each x ∈ S
𝜎(𝜎(𝜅)) = 𝜎(Δ𝜎(𝜅)) for each 𝜅 ∈ ΔΔS
More succinctly:
𝜎 𝛿 = 1S
𝜎 𝜎ΔS = 𝜎 Δ𝜎
(Here juxtaposition means function composition, 1S is the identity function on S,
and 𝜎ΔS ∶ ΔΔS → ΔS is the mixture operation on ΔS.)
We can sum this up abstractly using resources from category theory (see Pümplun
1991): superconvex spaces are the Eilenberg-Moore algebras of the “lotterymonad”
Δ.7
Any 𝜎-convex subset of a Banach space is a superconvex space. In general, there
are other kinds of superconvex spaces as well. For example, any countably complete
semi-lattice is a superconvex space, with the operation
Σ(p, x) = ⋁i∶p(i)>0
xi
7This “lottery monad” consists of the functor that takes each set X to the set of distributions ΔX
and each function f ∶ X → Y to the mixture-preserving function Δf, together with the two natural
transformations 𝛿 ∶ 1 → Δ and 𝜎Δ ∶ Δ2 → Δ. (Compare the “Giry monad” of Giry 1982.) An
Eilenberg-Moore algebra of this monad is precisely a pair of a set S and an operation 𝜎 ∶ ΔS → S
satsifying the two conditions in Proposition 3.
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(Consider, for example, a bounded set of integers with the maximum operation.
This is clearly not a 𝜎-convex subset of any Banach space.) There are also hybrid
spaces that combine “lattice-like” and “vector-like” behavior (for interesting exam-
ples see Fritz 2015). Even so, we will show that any preorder on one of these general
spaces can be represented perfectly well by some preorder on a lottery space.
We can straightforwardly extend the idea of a mixture-preserving function to ab-
stract superconvex spaces. (Pümplun (1991) calls such functions superaffine.) Here
we require a slightly more general notion, which preserves mixtures modulo indif-
ference.
Definition 6. If S and S′ are preordered superconvex spaces, a function f ∶ S → S′
is essentially mixture-preserving iff for each p ∈ Δ𝜔 and x ∈ S𝜔,
f(Σ(p, x)) ∼ ∑i
pi ⋅ f(xi)
Equivalently,
f(𝜎(𝜆)) ∼ 𝜎(Δf(𝜆)) for each 𝜆 ∈ ΔS
Or more succinctly,
f𝜎 ∼ 𝜎 Δf
(where for g, h ∶ X → S we write g ∼ h iff gx ∼ hx for each x ∈ X).
Lemma 12. For any superconvex space S and any preorder ≲ on S, there is a
unique preorder ≲∗ on ΔS with respect to which the function 𝛿 ∶ S → ΔS is strictly
monotone and essentially mixture-preserving.
Proof. For any 𝜆, 𝜇 ∈ ΔS, define
𝜆 ≲∗ 𝜇 iff 𝜎(𝜆) ≲ 𝜎(𝜇)
For x, y ∈ S,
𝛿(x) ≲∗ 𝛿(y) iff x = 𝜎(𝛿(x)) ≲ 𝜎(𝛿(y)) = y
So 𝛿 is strictly monotone. For 𝛿 to be essentially mixture-preserving requires 𝛿𝜎 ∼∗
𝜎ΔSΔ𝛿. So it suffices to show:
𝜎𝛿𝜎 = 𝜎 𝜎ΔSΔ𝛿
Using the identities 𝜎𝛿 = 1S and 𝜎 𝜎ΔS = 𝜎 Δ𝜎, and the functor identities Δ(fg) =
(Δf)(Δg) and Δ1S = 1ΔS, we have
𝜎𝛿𝜎 = 𝜎 = 𝜎 Δ(𝜎𝛿) = 𝜎 Δ𝜎 Δ𝛿 = 𝜎 𝜎ΔSΔ𝛿
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For uniqueness, note first that in general 𝜎ΔXΔ𝛿 = 1ΔX, which can be straightfor-
wardly checked.8 Therefore, since 𝛿 is essentially mixture-preserving,
1ΔS = 𝜎ΔSΔ𝛿 ∼∗ 𝛿 𝜎
Thus, if 𝛿 is also strictly monotone, for any 𝜆, 𝜇 ∈ ΔS we have
𝜆 ≲∗ 𝜇 iff 𝛿𝜎(𝜆) ≲∗ 𝛿𝜎(𝜇) iff 𝜎(𝜆) ≲ 𝜎(𝜇)
Lemma 13. If (S, ≲) satisfies (D*), then so does (ΔS, ≲∗).
Proof. Suppose 𝜆i ≲∗ 𝜇i for each i ∈ 𝜔; so 𝜎𝜆i ≲ 𝜎𝜇i. The operation 𝜎 ∶ ΔS → S is
itself mixture-preserving (this is what the identity 𝜎𝜎ΔS = 𝜎 Δ𝜎 tells us). So for any
p ∈ Δ𝜔 we have
𝜎Σ(p, 𝜆) = ∑i
pi ⋅ 𝜎𝜆i ≲∑i
pi ⋅ 𝜎𝜇i = 𝜎Σ(p, 𝜇)
And thus Σ(p, 𝜆) ≲∗ Σ(p, 𝜇). The case where we also have strictly 𝜆i < 𝜇i for some
i such that pi > 0 goes the same way.
We can now put this fact together with the representation theorem for lottery spaces,
to apply that theorem to arbitrary superconvex spaces.
Corollary 2. A totally preordered superconvex space (S, ≲) satisfies (D*) iff there is
a strictly monotonemixture-preserving function from S to Bℓ∞(𝜎), for some ordinal
𝛼.
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